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Abstract 
The article reports the results of different methods of modelling releases and dispersion of 
dangerous gases or vapours in cases of major accidents from road and rail transportation in urban 
zones. Transport accidents of dangerous substances are increasingly frequent and can cause serious 
injuries in densely inhabited areas or pollution of the environment. For quantitative risk assessment 
and mitigation planning, consequence modelling is necessary. 
The modelling of dangerous substance dispersion by standard methods does not fully represent 
the behaviour of toxic or flammable clouds in obstructed areas such as street canyons. Therefore the 
predictions from common software packages as ALOHA, EFFECTS, TerEx should be augmented with 
CFD models or physical modelling in aerodynamic tunnels, and further studies are planned to do this. 
The goal of this article is to present the results of the first approach of modelling using these 
standard methods and to demonstrate the importance of the next development stage in the area of 
transport accident modelling of releases and dispersions of dangerous substances in urban zones in 
cases of major accident or terrorist attacks.  
 
Key words: Major Accidents, Transportation of Dangerous Substances, Modelling of Release and 
Dispersion  
 
 
1. Introduction 
The area of major accident prevention represents a relatively new branch of science. Nevertheless, 
transportation accident prevention requirements are an outgrowth of this branch. The first approach is 
to evaluate stationary risk sources with the largest amount of dangerous substances. However, 
dangerous substances limits have been decreased (amendments of SEVESO II Directive) and current 
attention was moved to so-called “unclassified risk sources” and to mobile risk sources. Greater and 
greater amounts of dangerous substances are transported by road and rail. The threat of terrorist 
actions, possibly involving the transport of dangerous substances, has also contributed to interest in 
this area.  
The assessment of mobile risk sources is not yet prescribed by law in the European Union. 
However the transport of dangerous substances represents a particular hazard above all to the 
densely populated areas of urban zones, where releases of toxic or flammable substances into the air 
may endanger the health and/or lives of many inhabitants. To date, the evaluation of the 
consequences of accidents from mobile risk sources have been dealt with only haphazardly and not in 
detail.  
Information on the spread of atmospheric pollutants above a landscape after accidental releases 
can be collected by direct measurements of pollutant concentration levels, but only with sparse 
resolution. The results of mathematical modelling and/or the simulation of atmospheric conditions and 
the given landscape in an aerodynamic tunnel potentially represent a more comprehensive source of 
information. To predict the dispersion of toxic substances released into the troposphere as a result of 
accidents, mathematical modelling is the foremost tool. Some previous studies have compared 
modelling methods and simulation in case studies, for example study of chlorine releases from water 
treatment works (comparison of a flat terrain model with CFD model and wind tunnel modelling) 
(McBride et al., 2001) or CFD modelling of toxic gas dispersion in the vicinity of complex buildings, 
structures, and topography (comparison of FLACS model with 2D models) (Dharmavaram and Hanna, 
2007).  
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2. Accident history and statistics 
In the past, many transport accidents with dangerous substances have occurred worldwide. The 
following accidents are well known: road accident in Houston, USA in 1976, release of ammonia, 6 
people killed, 178 people injured; road accident in San Carlos, Spain in 1978, BLEVE of propylene, 
200 people killed; rail accident in Mississauga, Canada, in 1979, BLEVE of LPG and release of 
chlorine, 200,000 people evacuated; rail accident in Montanas, Mexico in 1981, release of chlorine, 28 
people killed, 1000 people injured; and other accidents. From study of 1932 accidents that occurred 
during the transport of hazardous substances by road and rail the results obtained show an increase 
in the frequency of accidents over time (Oggero et al., 2006). More than half of the accidents 
happened on roads (63%). The most frequent accidents were releases (78%), some of which were 
followed by fires (28%), explosions (14%) and gas clouds (6%).  
An example of a more recent accident is the train derailment near Minot, North Dakota (NTSB, 
2004). At approximately 1:37 a.m. on January 18, 2002, Canadian Pacific Railway freight train 292-16 
derailed 31 of its 112 cars about 1/2 mile west of the city limits of Minot, North Dakota. Five tank cars 
carrying anhydrous ammonia catastrophically ruptured, and a vapour plume covered the derailment 
site and surrounding area. One resident was fatally injured, 11 people sustained serious injuries, and 
322 people, including the 2 train crewmembers, sustained minor injuries. Damages exceeded $2 
million, and more than $8 million has been spent for environmental remediation. Contributing to the 
severity of the accident was the catastrophic failure of five tank cars and the instantaneous release of 
approximately 350 tonnes of anhydrous ammonia. A cloud of hydrolyzed ammonia formed almost 
immediately. This plume rose an estimated 300 feet (90 m) and gradually expanded 5 miles (8 km) 
downwind of the accident site and over a population of about 11,600 people (NTSB, 2004). Figure 1 
shows picture of the accident place and a plan of surrounding area. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1 - Accident scene and wreckage. Tierracita Vallejo neighbourhood (NSTB, 2004) 
 
In the Czech Republic, accident statistics are collected by the Transport Information System of the 
Ministry of Transport (DOK, 2007). Since 1996 a total 27,234 of accidents were registered in all types 
of dangerous substances transportation in the Czech Republic. The following data from years 2002 till 
2005 (the best reported years) were selected for the purpose of modelling releases and dispersion 
(table 1 and 2): 
Table 1 
Numbers of accidents in dangerous substances transportation in CZ (DOK, 2007)  
Year Road Rail 
2002 4,188 378 
2003 5,394 385 
2004 5,109 483 
2005 5,285 456 
Total 1996 - 2007 22,256 3,968 
Note: These include very small leakages without consequences (e.g. valve leakage) 
 
 
 
 
 2
Process safety and environmental protection. 2008, vol. 86, issue 3, p. 198-207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2007.12.002
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/65875 22/09/2011
 
Table 2 
Numbers of accidents caused by selected dangerous substances (DOK, 2007)  
 Ammonia anhydrous Gasoline 
Year Road Rail Road Rail 
2002 36 2 725 49 
2003 44 4 820 38 
2004 40 9 748 85 
2005 35 13 686 36 
Total 1996 - 2007 284 83 3,108 2,340 
 
As examples of other dangerous substances chlorine (total 69 accidents) and LPG – Liquefied 
Petroleum Gas (registered as propane – 24 accidents) were selected. 
In the U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT), PHMSA - the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials 
Safety Administration has public responsibility for the safe and secure movement of hazardous 
materials to industry and consumers by all transportation modes. PHMSA revised the definition of a 
serious incident in 2002, and the current definition is (from the point of view road and of rail transport 
only): (PHMSA, 2007) 
• a fatality or major injury caused by the release of a hazardous material, 
• the evacuation of 25 or more persons as a result of release of a hazardous material or 
exposure to fire, 
• a release or exposure to fire which results in the closure of a major transportation artery, 
• the release of a bulk quantity (over 119 gallons or 882 pounds) of a hazardous material. 
PHMSA has submitted annual statistics of transport incidents in USA. The following tables (table 3 - 5) 
give the most important data for comparison with the above mentioned.   
Table 3  
Hazardous Material Transportation Incidents in USA by Mode and Incident Year (PHMSA, 2007) 
 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 Total 
Air  13  25  18  35 37 15 13 6 19  17  198 
Highway  397  356  447  449 488 377 399 400 418  389  4,120 
Rail  61  72  68  83 63 71 58 82 84  75  717 
Water  1  4  0  2 1 3 2 4 2  1  20 
Total  472  457  533  569 589 466 472 492 523  482  5,055 
Table 4  
HAZMAT Summary by Result for 2006 (PHMSA, 2007) 
  INJURIES   
Result Incidents Hospitalized
Non-
Hospitalized Fatalities Damage($) 
Vapour (Gas) Dispersion  467 7 31 0  16,948,674
Material Entered Waterway/Sewer  63 2 18 4  9,373,803
Spillage  19,034 22 171 5  59,455,638
Fire  54 6 3 6  8,564,879
Explosion  35 3 3 3  1,948,564
Environmental Damage  85 3 20 3  29,253,693
None  828 0 0 0  5,415,131
Total - 2006  20,566 43 246 21  130,960,382
Note: Due to multiple results being involved in a single incident, the total above may not correspond to the total in other 
reports. 
Table 5  
Commodity Summary by Total Injuries for Calendar Year – 2006 (PHMSA, 2007) 
Rank Commodity Name  Hazard Class  Injuries  % 
1 Corrosive Liquids Toxic Corrosive Material 50 21.55 
2 Anhydrous Ammonia Poisonous Gas 20 8.62 
3 Environmentally Haz Liq Miscellaneous Hazardous Material 16 6.90 
4 Corros Liq Acidic Inorgan Corrosive Material 8 3.45 
4 Sodium Hydroxide Solution Corrosive Material 8 3.45 
6 Gasoline Flammable-Combustible Liquid 6 2.59 
6 Sulfuric Acid Corrosive Material 6 2.59 
8 Liquefied Petroleum Gas Flammable Compressed Gas 5 2.16 
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8 Hydrochloric Acid Solutn Corrosive Material 5 2.16 
8 Maleic Anhydride Corrosive Material 5 2.16 
11 Paint Combustible Liquid 4 1.72 
11 Chlorine Poisonous Gas 4 1.72 
11 Silicon Tetrafluoride Poisonous Gas 4 1.72 
11 Acetic Acid Glacial Corrosive Material 4 1.72 
11 Amines Liq Corros Flam Corrosive Material 4 1.72 
11 Corros Liq Basic Inorgani Corrosive Material 4 1.72 
17 Pyridine Flammable-Combustible Liquid 3 1.29 
17 Hydrazine Aqueous Solutio Corrosive Material 3 1.29 
17 Phosphoric Acid Corrosive Material 3 1.29 
17 Sulfuric Acid >51% Corrosive Material 3 1.29 
21 Ammonia Anhydrous Nonflammable Compressed Gas 2 0.86 
21 Diesel Fuel Flammable-Combustible Liquid 2 0.86 
… …  … … 
Total 232 
 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL, 2000) also reports on transport risk in the USA. The purpose of 
this National Transportation Risk Assessment (NTRA) study was to quantitatively characterize the 
risks associated with the transportation of selected hazardous materials on a national basis. On the 
basis of the risks from TIH materials (TIH - toxic by inhalation), the results suggest that chlorine and 
ammonia account for 70% to 80% of the total TIH transportation risk (see Figure 2). Considering 
fatality risks on a per-ton-mile basis, the risks from LP gas substantially exceed the risks for gasoline, 
TIH, and explosives (see Figure 3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 2 - Distribution of Total TIH Fatality (ANL, 2000) Fig. 3 - Fatalities Normalized by Commodity Flow (ANL, 2000) 
 
 
3. Case study definition: Description of methodical approaches and accident scenarios 
The dispersion of admixtures in the atmospheric boundary layer can be investigated on the basis of 
two different approaches of mathematical modelling that are as follows: 
− standard (diffusion, Gaussian) models; 
− CFD models (based on calculations of the system of hydrodynamic and thermodynamic 
equations). 
In the present study, some methodologies developed in a standard way are applied to the estimation 
and assessment of risks associated with accidental releases of dangerous substances, and in this 
framework, standard software applications can be employed. For the purpose of hazardous zones 
modelling the following representative software packages were selected:  
− ALOHA 5.4.1. [a representative of free-downloaded software from U.S. EPA (ALOHA, 2007)]; 
− EFFECTSGIS 5.5. [customary software of the Dutch company TNO (EFFECTS, 2004)]; 
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− TerEx 2.7.8. [a commercially available software of the Czech company T-SOFT (TerEx, 2005)]. 
Generally, it might be argued that models currently used in risk assessment and evaluation of the 
consequences of accidents were developed to fit tasks characterized by boundary conditions and 
dispersion characteristics that are much more simple compared to those relevant to real urban zones. 
However, to obtain rough results, these models may be applied; the resulting distances of hazardous 
zones are then conservative, with many uncertainties in the case of obstacles present (high buildings). 
After evaluating historical accidents and related statistical sources, the following hazardous 
substances were finally chosen as representative for modelling: 
- Anhydrous ammonia – a toxic gas lighter than air; 
- Chlorine – a toxic gas heavier than air; 
- Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) – a flammable gas; 
- Gasoline – a flammable liquid. 
These selected substances represent some of the most hazardous substances transported in the 
greatest quantities. Within this case study, two types both of road cargo tanks (MC331 High Pressure 
Tank, MC306 Nonpressure Liquid Tank) and rail tank cars (Pressurized Tank Cars, Nonpressurized 
Tank Cars) were taken into account (TRA, 1995). Traffic collisions or derailments were assumed as 
general scenarios of transport accidents. Two main releases of the selected substances were 
modelled: instantaneous release (in duration less than 1 min) as the worst case scenario (catastrophic 
rupture - 300 mm hole), and semi-continuous release as an alternative scenario representing a more 
probable accidental situation (50 mm hole). The severity and representative nature of the selected 
scenarios can be seen by comparing data released by the UK Advisory Committee on Dangerous 
Substances of HSC (ACDS, 1991), the U.S. Department of Transportation (US DOT, 1993) and the 
Argonne National Laboratory (ANL, 2000). For the purpose of real risk assessment in particular 
transport routes, the proposed strategy is to treat the most hazardous substances used in local 
industrial companies. This strategy aims to be constructive and relevant in the event of terrorist 
attacks.   
The most important meteorological conditions influencing the dispersion of dangerous substances 
are direction and speed of wind, stability class and air temperature. Regarding many possibilities in 
real situations, the following basic conditions were finally chosen for modelling:  
- The neutral stability of atmosphere [D class; medium wind speed of 5 m·s-1 (the most frequent 
conditions during the year → the most probable scenario)]; 
- The very stable stability of atmosphere [F class; low wind speed of 1.7 m·s-1 (the worst 
dispersion conditions, cloud impact of the largest area → the worst case scenario)]. 
The following Table 6 summarises all important input data necessary for modelling of releases and 
dispersion of the selected dangerous substances originating from road or rail transport.  
 
Table 6  
Summary of input data for modelling  
Scenario 
No.∗1
Dangerous 
substance
Amount 
(road/rail) 
[t] 
Type of 
release 
Daytime Stability 
class 
Wind 
speed 
[m/s] 
Tempera
ture  
[°C] 
Level of 
concern  
[ppm] ∗2
1.1 A / B day  D 5 25 
1.2 A / B catastrophic night F    1.7 10 
1.3 A / B day  D 5 25 
1.4 A / B 
Ammonia 15 / 50 
continuous night F    1.7 10 
7,700  
(50% mort. / 
30 min) 
2.1 A / B day  D 5 25 
2.2 A / B catastrophic night F    1.7 10 
2.3 A / B day  D 5 25 
2.4 A / B 
Chlorine 20 / 55 
continuous night F    1.7 10 
380  
(50% mort. / 
30 min) 
3.1 A / B day  D 5 25 
3.2 A / B catastrophic night F    1.7 10 
3.3 A / B day  D 5 25 
3.4 A / B 
LPG 10 / 24 
continuous night F    1.7 10 
12,600 
(60% LEL) 
4.1 A / B day  D 5 25 
4.2 A / B catastrophic night F    1.7 10 
4.3 A / B day  D 5 25 
4.4 A / B 
Gasoline 25 / 58 
continuous night F    1.7 10 
8,400 
(60% LEL) 
Notes: ∗1 A for road, B for rail 
 ∗2 from EFFECTSGIS 5.5 database 
 5
Process safety and environmental protection. 2008, vol. 86, issue 3, p. 198-207. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.psep.2007.12.002
DSpace VŠB-TUO http://hdl.handle.net/10084/65875 22/09/2011
 
The scenarios are described as a two-phase flow after the release of liquefied gases, followed by 
their dispersion. The dispersion of gasoline (a flammable liquid) was calculated by pool evaporation 
after the release. The fatal zones for toxic substances were modelled by a probit function employing 
the LC50 concentration for 30 min exposure. For flammable substances the fatal zones represent 60 % 
of LEL for a potential flash fire or vapour cloud explosion. To approximately match the multiple 
obstacles in cities, the highest landscape roughness was considered during all simulations. 
 
 
4. Results and Discussion 
Software packages ALOHA and EFFECTS represent well-known pre-accident modelling tools 
commonly employed in assessment of dangerous substances releases, dispersion, and other effects 
and consequences. A relatively new model used mainly by rescue teams in cases of accidents (post-
accident modelling) has been implemented in the software package TerEx. 
The following comparisons are discussed before making more general conclusions on the results 
obtained: 
a) pre-accident versus post-accident modelling; 
b) results based on ALOHA and EFFECTS software calculations; 
c) the severity of catastrophic and of semi-continuous scenarios; 
d) distances of hazardous zones under two types of weather conditions (the most frequent versus 
the worst condition from the point of view of cloud dispersion); 
e) a general comparison of different results as inputs for risk assessment of the substances in 
question. 
 
The results of modelling for particular substances, when used with identical data input 
assumptions, are summarized in the following tables (see Table 7 – 10). 
Table 7  
Results of modelling for ammonia 
ALOHA EFFECTS TerEx 
Scenario 
No.∗1
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Evacuation  
zone  
[m] 
1.1 A  227   1   726 1,391      0.20 681    639 
1.2 A 227   1   800 1,065      0.25 280 1,830 
1.3 A   13 18   175      38  6 258    647 
1.4 A     9 25   236      29  8 244 3,440 
1.1 B 756   1 1,300 1,390       0.50 693 1,100 
1.2 B 756   1 1,400 1,068        0.75 280 3,160 
1.3 B   13 59   175      38 20 258    649 
1.4 B     9 60   236      29 27 244 3,450 
Notes: ∗1 A for road, B for rail 
Table 8  
Results of modelling for chlorine 
ALOHA EFFECTS TerEx 
Scenario 
No.∗1
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Evacuation  
zone  
[m] 
2.1 A  302   1 1,600 1,790       0.16 1,068 1,710 
2.2 A 302   1 1,400 1,410       0.21   647 4,250 
2.3 A   21 16    580      49   6   416 1,810 
2.4 A   15 21    673      39   8     96 8,480 
2.1 B 832    1 2,300 1,790        0.45 1,139 2,600 
2.2 B 832    1 2,200 1,410        0.60    810 6,480 
2.3 B   21 43    580      49 16    418 1,820 
2.4 B   15 58    679      39 22    109 8,510 
Notes: ∗1 A for road, B for rail 
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Table 9  
Results of modelling for LPG (propane) 
ALOHA EFFECTS TerEx 
Scenario 
No.∗1
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Evacuation  
zone  
[m] 
3.1 A  151   1 242 1,209       0.12 24 215 
3.2 A 151   1 392    978       0.16 32 414 
3.3 A  14 12   69      33   4   4   42 
3.4 A  10 15 120      27   6   4 219 
3.1 B 363   1 391 1,209        0.28 23 305 
3.2 B 363   1 574    978        0.38 31 565 
3.3 B  14 28   70      33 10   4   42 
3.4 B  10 37 121      27 14   6 220 
Notes: ∗1 A for road, B for rail 
Table 10  
Results of modelling for gasoline 
ALOHA EFFECTS TerEx 
Scenario 
No.∗1
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Release 
rate  
[kg/s] 
Release 
duration 
[min] 
Fatal  
zone  
[m] 
Evacuation  
zone  
[m] 
4.1 A  20   23 37 32   3 43   48 
4.2 A   6 >60 56 11 12 27 133 
4.3 A      1.6 >60 10   7 24 15   22 
4.4 A      1.1 >60 22   5 30 14   59 
4.1 B 34   32 46 82   3 45   73 
4.2 B 12 >60 86 29 11 45 200 
4.3 B      1.6 >60 10 13 30 21   22 
4.4 B      1.1 >60 21   3 30 20   59 
Notes: ∗1 A for road, B for rail 
 
Employing models implemented in the EFFECTS software package, the hazardous zones 
calculated for chlorine tank car accidents (scenarios 2.1 B – 2.4 B) are depicted in Figure 4. As it is 
graphic, the software output makes a comparison of various scenarios easier, displaying different 
possible concentration contours in one scheme.  
2.1B 2.2B 2.3B 2.4B
X [m]
1,1001,000900800700600500400300200100
Y 
[m
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350
300
250
200
150
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50
0
-50
-100
-150
-200
-250
-300
-350
 
Fig. 4 – Example of modelling results for scenarios of chlorine tank car accidents, employing the graphical output 
of the EFFECTS software 
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The TerEx software package is a tool for the quick modelling needed during an emergency (post-
accident modelling). For this reason, calculations can generally be done just employing a few input 
data. Therefore, more conservative results should also be expected. Recommended evacuation zones 
are derived from injury criteria (for toxic substances, e.g. IDLH) and the distances would be longer 
than fatal zone distances. (Note that fatality data is more certain than numbers of people harmed, but 
the numbers also depend on the chance distribution of people within the affected zone.) A comparison 
of results with pre-accident modelling is obviously possible but with caution: the main difference is that 
calculation speed must be kept as an essential feature of the post-accident programs, and this is 
generally at the expense of more detailed modelling. 
The results of hazardous zones obtained by ALOHA and EFFECTS software applications are 
generally similar, at least of the same order. The greatest difference was for propane, where ALOHA 
shows the fatal zones in order of hundreds metres compared with EFFECTS in tens of metres only. 
However, the release rate and release durations differ more, in some cases the release rates differ 6 
to 8 fold! With regard to input data identical for both software applications, the calculated release rates 
differ more than the distances of the hazardous zones (e.g. ammonia 1.1A: the release rate of 227 / 
1391 kg⋅s-1 and the hazardous zones of 726 / 681 m). The program EFFECTS calculates shorter 
distances of fatal zones in most cases. Thus, the program ALOHA can be described as a more 
conservative tool from the point of view of risk assessment.  
The severity of catastrophic ruptures (300 mm hole, instantaneous releases of duration less than 1 
minute) is several times higher than the investigated alternative scenarios of higher probability (50 mm 
hole, semi-continuous releases). The clouds will reach longer and wider distances and the affected 
area will be much larger. Therefore, eventual casualties in densely inhabited areas will be higher too. 
On the other hand, the catastrophic release is less probable for common accidents. Its probability, 
however, could rise through terrorist attacks. 
Atmospheric conditions can also have a significant influence on the cloud dispersion. Commonly, it 
is accepted that the cloud could reach a longer range under very stable conditions compared to 
neutral ones. However, most of the results based on the EFFECTS model calculations demonstrate 
short distances in case of obstacles (the highest surface roughness). Further calculations need to be 
done for a more detailed comparison. 
The overall results show a high-level severity in cases of accidents within urban zones. Taking into 
account all the selected dangerous substances, chlorine could cause the largest fatal zone. When 
considering road or rail transport accidents, the radius of affected zone is up about 1 km. The results 
of ammonia dispersion modelling are characterized by a shorter radius of the order of hundreds of 
metres. Propane and gasoline, the flammable substances, are dispersed so that explosive (or 
flammable) mixtures can be expected close to the release source only (i.e. up to a distance of a few 
hundred metres for propane, and about 50 m for gasoline). For purely accidental releases the total 
severity of these accidents must be judged together with the frequencies in inhabited areas. For 
example, a chlorine accident has high severity and lower probability compared to a gasoline accident 
with low severity and higher probability. 
 
5. Environmental aspects of accidental releases originating in transport of dangerous 
substances 
In major accidents of stationary and mobile risk sources (fires, explosions and toxic releases) a large 
quantity of gaseous pollutants and/or aerosols come into the troposphere, producing significant air 
pollution. Furthermore, accidental releases of dangerous substances can subsequently influence other 
environmental systems and sub-systems. Thus for transport accidents, the environmental fate of the 
evaluated compounds has also been reviewed. The results are discussed below reflecting the 
knowledge base currently available by a literature search. 
 
A m m o n i a 
Ammonia evaporates at temperatures above –33°C and will transport over several kilometres as a 
gas. It readily forms ammonium sulphate particles when sulphur compounds occur in air: these 
particles then can be transported over hundreds of kilometres in plumes. Of all atmospheric ammonia 
reactions known, one of the most important seems to be that involving conversion of ammonia to 
ammonium (NH4+) particulate (PSLAR, 1999): 
NH2HSO3 + NH3  ⇔  NH2·SO3NH4       (1) 
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This conversion occurs in the lowest 100 m of the atmosphere at rates ranging from 1x10–3 s-1 to 5x10–
5 s-1 (this is a first-order reaction, which means the reaction rate is dependent on the concentration of 
one reactant, namely NH3), and daytime conversion is much faster than that at night. The reaction is 
dependent on temperature, relative humidity and pH. All studies conveyed the opinion that the main 
factors obstructing a long-range transport of ammonia in the atmosphere, both vertically and 
horizontally, are a rapid conversion to ammonium aerosol and the relatively high dry deposition 
velocity of ammonia. Because of rapid reaction rates of ammonia in air, anything between 56 % and 
94 % of atmospheric ammonia is converted to ammonium particulate/ammonium aerosol. Over 
oceans, ammonium particulate/ammonium aerosol has an estimated atmospheric residence time of 22 
hours; over land, the estimated residence time is in the range of 7–19 days. In comparison, the 
estimated residence time of atmospheric NH3 is 3.6 hours over oceans and in the range of 2.8 hours 
to 4 days over land. These short residence times are primarily due to the rapid conversion to 
ammonium particulate/ammonium aerosol and the high dry deposition velocities of ammonia. 
Ammonia is not involved in the formation of ground-level ozone, the depletion of stratospheric ozone 
or climate changes (PSLAR, 1999). 
In the atmosphere, ammonia may undergo many transformations; the most important removal 
mechanism is represented by dissolution in water droplets, which can subsequently be removed by 
rain or washout. Ammonia can also be removed by reaction with OH radicals. In soil, the most likely 
fate of ammonia is its conversion to nitrates through the nitrification action of micro-organisms. Nitrates 
are in turn lost from soils by leaching, denitrification and uptake by the plant root systems. In natural 
waters, ammonia can be removed by bacteria through nitrification, assimilation by aquatic algae and 
macrophytes, adsorption on particulates and subsequent sedimentation, and volatilization. These 
processes contribute to the natural cycling of nitrogen in the environment, and help to prevent the 
persistence and accumulation of elevated levels of ammonia. Studies describing toxicological effects 
of ammonia on wildlife are limited, as ammonia occurring in the atmosphere at common concentration 
levels is not usually harmful to animals. It has been suggested that non-ionized ammonia (NH3) 
represents a primary toxic specie to fish (OSA, 2001). Ammonia can also reach toxic concentrations 
during transport accidents near forests or remote areas. 
 
C h l o r i n e 
Chlorine exists as a greenish-yellow gas under standard conditions (25°C and pressure of 1 atm), or 
as a high-density amber liquid when compressed. Information regarding the environmental fate of 
chlorine in air was not found in the secondary sources searched. Since chlorine is converted to HCl in 
the atmosphere, prevailing meteorology strongly determines the fate of HCl in the atmosphere. 
However, HCl is not considered as a strongly persistent pollutant or one where long range transport is 
important in predicting its ecological effects. In the atmosphere, HCl can be expected to be absorbed 
into aqueous aerosols, due to its great affinity for water, and removed from the troposphere by rainfall. 
In addition, HCl will react with hydroxyl ions to yield water plus chloride ions (EPA, 1994). 
Chlorine may react with soil components to form chlorides; depending on their water solubility, 
these chlorides are easily washed out from the soil. Chlorine hydrolyses very rapidly in water (rate 
constants range from 1.5x10-4 s-1 at 0°C to 4.0x10-4 s-1 at 25°C; the half-life in natural waters is 
approximately equal to 0.005 s). In fresh- and wastewaters at pH >6, complete hydrolysis occurs with 
the formation of hypochlorous acid (HOCl) and chloride ion (Cl-). The hypochlorous acid ionizes to 
hydrogen ion (H+) and hypochlorite ion (OCl-). Vaporization of molecular chlorine (Cl2) from water to 
the atmosphere may be significant at low pH values and high concentrations (e.g., pH=2 and 3500 
mg⋅l-1 chlorine), but is insignificant at neutral pH and low concentrations. There is no potential for the 
bioaccumulation or bioconcentration of chlorine, but chlorine has high acute toxicity to aquatic 
organisms (EPA, 1994). 
 
L P G 
Liquefied petroleum gas primarily comprises propane and butane, so the physical properties of a 
specific commercial LPG will depend on the relative proportions of its constituents (e.g. in the UK, LPG 
typically consists of 90 % propane). LPG is denser than air and thus will accumulate in places such as 
drains, trenches or other depressions. The high vapour pressures of propane and butane suggest that 
almost all of any LPG released will enter the atmosphere. Propane and butane in the atmosphere are 
degraded by reaction with photo-chemically produced hydroxyl radicals. The reaction with hydroxyl 
radicals under the influence of sunlight is estimated to result in half-lives of 13 days for propane and 
6 days for butane. The Henry’s Law constants (0.7067 atm⋅m3⋅mol-1 for propane; 0.9497 atm⋅m3⋅mol-1 
for butane) suggest rapid volatilisation from aquatic environments. These hydrocarbons are not 
sensitive to hydrolysis under environmental conditions but are considered readily biodegradable. 
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Bioconcentration factors have been estimated for propane to range from 1.56 to 1.78 and those for 
butane from 1.78 to 1.79; thus bioconcentration is not an important factor influencing organisms in 
aquatic systems. Estimated Koc values ranging from 450 to 460 in case of propane, or 450 to 900 in 
case of butane, respectively, indicate that some of the primary constituents of LPG may partition from 
water column to organic matter contained in sediments and suspended materials. However, 
volatilisation is expected to be the dominant rate process (ETSU, 2000).  
 
G a s o l i n e 
Gasoline is a complex mixture of hydrocarbon compounds which have differing properties and 
therefore different behaviours in the environment. If released to the open environment, the majority of 
compounds present in gasoline will evaporate to the atmosphere where they will be degraded by 
reaction with hydroxyl radicals in a matter of days. Because gasoline floats on water, it may be carried 
for long distances from initial source by water courses, sewers, drains or groundwater. The majority of 
gasoline released to soil will be biodegraded. The range of log Kow values for gasoline compounds 
(those with log Kow > 4) suggests that a number of compounds found in gasoline will have the potential 
to bioaccumulate significantly in aquatic and/or terrestrial organisms (ETSU, 2000).  
 
The summary of impacts of the evaluated substances on the main environment compartments is 
shown in the following Table 11. 
Table 11 
Environmental compartments affected by evaluated substances 
Environmental compartment Dangerous 
substances Air Water Soil 
Ammonia + + - 
Chlorine + + - 
LPG + - - 
Gasoline + + + 
+ Significant effects 
- No significant effects 
 
Environmental damage caused by accidents from dangerous substances transport depends mainly 
on the specific location of the accident and on the substance state of matter. For example, if an 
accident with liquids or liquefied gases occurs near surface water, then water will represent the most 
influenced environmental compartment. Similarly, most of a dangerous substance would probably be 
evaporated to air if the location of accident is on an impervious hard surface. In the atmosphere, the 
humidity also plays an important role - differences can appear in zones affected by vapour clouds 
under rainfall and dry weather conditions. Water drops could wash out vapour from the air, 
contaminating soil or surface water (e.g. the Seveso accident in 1976). Generally, it can be stated that 
the atmosphere represents the main transfer medium for released substances to enter other 
environmental compartments (biota, soil, and surface water). The topography of the accident location 
is another factor which will significantly influence the range of dispersed cloud.  
 
6. Discussion 
It should be noted that standard software either neglects humidity and topography, or is relatively 
insensitive to variations in them. Therefore these conditions should be explored by wind tunnel 
experiments and CFD modelling. 
While risk assessment of dangerous substances during transport is covered by general safety 
laws, there are as yet no European laws which require sites to consider the external transport of 
products and raw materials as part of their general operation. The Seveso II directive covers only 
internal transport of dangerous substances inside industrial companies, but external transport can be 
more dangerous to people and the environment. In addition, the methodology of transportation risk 
assessment is not as developed in scope as for stationary risk sources. The best known 
methodologies are only three guidelines, the Major Hazard Aspects of the Transport of Dangerous 
Substances of HSE (ACDS, 1991), the Transportation Risk Analysis of AIChE (TRA, 1995) and Dutch 
methodology in publication “Purple Book” (TNO, 1999). Consequence evaluation is an important part 
in risk assessment even if the results often contain many uncertainties. A method to identify and 
quantitatively evaluate such uncertainties would be to carry out a comparative study of mathematical 
diffusion models and computational fluid dynamics (CFD) models of the same scenario. In addition, 
physical modelling employing an appropriate wind tunnel should be applied to obtain data which is 
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most relevant. Because CFD modelling as well as wind tunnel experiments are expensive and time-
consuming approaches, the results of the assessments which have been reported above can serve as 
a basis for preparing such simulations,. The aim is the investigation of the limitations of standard 
models, and possible ways of their improvement, respectively. These sub-goals also represent the first 
step necessary for building up a more comprehensive step-by-step methodology generally applicable 
to assessment of mobile risk sources.  
 
 
7. Conclusion  
At present, the estimation of consequences of accidents of mobile risk sources is carried out rather 
sporadically, usually employing simple mathematical models. The models used only give indications of 
hazardous zones following the release and dispersion of dangerous substances in densely inhabited 
areas. Nevertheless, the determination of hazardous zones is important to evaluate the possible 
consequences of major accidents or terrorist attacks. A critical comparison of existing methods has 
been carried out as the basis for further study. Model releases and dispersion of dangerous gases (or 
vapours) in cases of major accidents of road and rail transportation in urban zones have been 
investigated and their possible consequences discussed in our contribution. 
The ultimate aim of this project is to provide practical help in the assessment of risks related to the 
transport of dangerous substances and stationary risk sources located in built-up and inhabited areas. 
The results could be useful for various studies of acute and chronic risks and/or environmental risks 
related to accidental releases into the atmosphere, when measures for prevention or mitigation are to 
be proposed. For example, this may influence the location of ventilation intakes in buildings located 
near a possible accident site (fixed or transport). It may be possible to make better comparisons of 
possible transport routes of dangerous substances in terms of the likely outcome of an accident. 
Finally, our results can be employed when preparing more sophisticated simulations based on 
computational fluid dynamics modelling and wind tunnel experiments, and aimed at investigation of 
the limitations of standard models on one hand, and their improvement on the other hand.  
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